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INTRODUCTION

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,' handed down on May 18, 2009, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that Javaid Iqbal failed to plead sufficient facts to
support the allegation that he had been arbitrarily and unconstitutionally
classified by the federal government as a person "of high interest" and
detained in a maximum security facility after September 11th, 2001
because of his race, religion, and national origin.2 In affirming dismissal
of the complaint, the Court noted that the facts alleged did not "'nudge[]
[the plaintiffs'] claims' of invidious discrimination 'across the line from
conceivable to plausible."' 3 Iqbal ostensibly extended to intent-based
civil claims the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly, 4 mandating that pleadings in antitrust cases
must allege enough facts to plausibly "sho[w] that the pleader is entitled
to relief' 5 under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6
To say that Iqbal modified the pleading standard in certain types of
cases would be a dramatic understatement. The decision profoundly
transformed the jurisprudential landscape, shifting the course of lawsuits
nationwide. A cursory glance at the ruling's rate of citation gives a
measure of its sweeping impact. Based on a recent search, in the single
year since it was decided, Iqbal has been cited six times by the Supreme
Court, over 300 times by the courts of appeals, and more than 6,500
times by district courts. The pleading requirement set out in Iqbal has
been extended beyond the Bivens claims at issue in that case to a number
of different causes of action, including Section 1981 and Title VII. Its
vast influence commands close attention, as does the fact that it arose out

1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2. Id. at 1951-52. Ehab Elmaghraby, one of the original plaintiffs, withdrew from
the lawsuit after reaching a settlement with the federal government for $300,000. Javaid
Iqbal, the other original plaintiff, continued with the lawsuit. See Nina Bernstein, U.S. is
Settling Detainee's Suit in 9/11 Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006.
3. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.
4. Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
5. Id. at 555.
6. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (rejecting argument that "Twombly should be
limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute"). See also FED. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2) ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: ... (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.").
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of-and dismissed-a discrimination case brought by a member of an
unpopular minority group.
That fact is of particular note because an institutionalized regard for
minority entitlements is an important systemic feature preventing
democratic governance from devolving into the tyranny of the majority
so dreaded by the Framers.7 Protections for minorities are embedded in
the Constitution and in a variety of statutes, oversight of which is left
largely to the least democratic of the three branches of government-the
federal judiciary. Relatively insulated from popular whim, the courts are
minority groups' most natural allies in the United States' tripartite
constitutional arrangement. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that "more searching judicial inquiry" is appropriate to counteract
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities."8 Commentators, too,
have stressed the centrality of that particular judicial function in our
polity. John Hart Ely wrote about identifying "those groups in society to
whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in
attending," arguing that "it would not make sense" to assign the
protection of such insular minorities "to anyone but the courts." Ely took
as the starting point of his analysis that "courts should protect those who
can't protect themselves politically" by virtue of their minority status.9
This Article aims to highlight the limitations and pitfalls of the
approach taken in Iqbal through critical examination of the Court's
reasoning, on its own terms and in an empirical light, drawing on recent
opinion polls about discrimination and statistics detailing the
composition of the federal bench, as well as on emerging caselaw in the
decision's wake. Iqbal's embrace of judges' subjective assessments
under the guise of "plausibility" and "common sense" raises concerns
that Muslim Americans' and other minority plaintiffs' claims of

7. Of course, the Framers' regard for minorities was quite selective. Notably, it did
not include women, African-Americans, and Native-Americans. This Article employs
the term "minority" only with great reluctance and for lack of less problematic and
equally intelligible shorthand terminology. Commonly understood, the term captures
ethnic, racial, and religious groups in the United States that generally self-define or are
characterized as non-"white" or non-Christian. Even assuming the existence of a single,
monolithic, undifferentiated "white" group, so-called "minority" groups, when counted
together, currently make up a significant share of the country's population. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 2005, at 2, available at http://www.census.gov/
population/www/pop-profile/files/dynamic/RACEHO.pdf (finding that "non-whites"
account for nearly 96 million people). Given privilege and power disparities, women,
too, are frequently studied as a "minority" group, notwithstanding the statistical reality
that there are more females than males in the population of the United States. The term
can also be read to carry a dismissive connotation, which this Article does not aim to
convey.
8. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 151-52 (1980).
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discrimination-claims that members of these groups find plausible,
indeed evident-are far less likely to find agreement with a federal
judiciary that does not shine by its diversity.
By enhancing and privileging the dominant, majority perspective's
role in a judicial assessment that determines minority rights, the Iqbal
decision undermines a major fagade of the constitutional design and, by
extension, the rights of minority groups in this country. Indeed, the
Court's coarse reliance on "plausibility" and "common sense"' 0 signals
an embrace of unfettered judicial subjectivity, setting the stage for the
Court's association of broad swathes of immigrants and citizens with
terrorists, simply because "the September 11 attacks were perpetrated by
19 Arab Muslim hijackers."' Though the decision nowhere disclaims
fealty to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)'s requirement of a short
and plain statement nor does it reject the notion that such statements
must be accepted as true, it strays from that standard by injecting
indeterminate and, ultimately, subjective metrics into the threshold
determination.
Judicial discretion, of course, is not the enemy. Our legal system
requires and regulates the exercise of subjective judicial discretion in a
The
variety of procedural postures and for a range of reasons.
application of judicial subjectivity is indispensable in those settings;
indeed, the influence of subjectivity is inescapable in other contexts as
well, where it is not supposed to play as prominent a role. The concern
at the core of this Article relates to the embrace of unfettered judicial
subjectivity and its elevation to the rank of a factor of existential
consequence. It is by placing the threshold viability of a legal claim at
the mercy of unfettered judicial subjectivity that Iqbal seems to cut
against the grain of basic fairness, including precepts that are taken and
touted as fundamental-that ours is "a government of laws and not of
men," for instance.12 While it was more of a decider in close calls, after
some discovery and litigation, Iqbal seems to have transformed judicial
gut instinct into a gate-keeping mechanism.
Discrimination claims are particularly vulnerable to an unfavorable
application of dispositive judicial discretion at the threshold stage.
Under Iqbal, such claims require a showing of animus or deliberate,
invidious intent, which is less likely at the stage where there are the
fewest facts available, particularly in cases characterized by stark
informational asymmetries between the parties. That the exercise of
10. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (holding that a determination of
"whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense").
11. Id. at 1951.
12. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX.
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judicial subjectivity is, to an extent, racially-inflected raises concerns that
minority plaintiffs' odds of success are even further reduced.
Part I of the Article scrutinizes Iqbal's reasoning and its problematic
embrace of a subjective plausibility standard at the threshold viability
stage.
Following that analysis, it seemed necessary to identify some of the
common sense metrics that might determine what comes out of the black
box of plausibility assessment. Part II of this Article begins by surveying
recent polls and studies reflecting Muslim Americans' experiences of
discrimination and the prevalence of anti-Muslim sentiment in the United
States. That exercise reveals that whether one believes an invidious
discrimination narrative offered by a member of a particular group
depends in significant part on the personal background of the observer
relative to that of the individual offering the discrimination narrative. In
other words, plausibility is in the eye of the beholder and how one
assesses plausibility is also colored by the discrimination claimant's
origins. Part II then explores how judges are not wholly impervious to
ambient biases held by the general public and how their own
backgrounds, experiences, and views have a documented impact on
judicial outcomes-even ones less overtly pegged to subjective views
than cases are under Iqbal. Finally, the inquiry turns to the relative lack
of diversity on the federal bench and how, given all of the above, the
wide latitude for judicial subjectivity under Iqbal bodes poorly for future
discrimination claims brought by members of minority groups, generally,
and Muslim plaintiffs, in particular.
Finally, in Part III, an overview of its progeny thus far tests
predictions about the gravity of the threat Iqbal poses to equal protection,
and probes the analysis offered here of Iqbal's problematic embrace of
judicial subjectivity. Cases in its wake so far confirm that Iqbal will
carry particularly acute risk when it comes to unlawful discrimination
claims brought by members of minority groups.
I.

IQBAL'S DISQUIETING EMBRACE OF JUDICIAL SUBJECTIVITY: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RULING

After Twombly and Iqbal, the facts alleged in a complaint must be
sufficient to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged" to survive a motion to dismiss.13 As will be
explored in greater detail below, a survey of caselaw that has emerged in
the wake of Twombly and Iqbal makes clear that federal courts have
derived a two-prong pleading standard from the Supreme Court's

13.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
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rulings: 1) a court is not required to accept as true "legal conclusions"
that are framed as factual allegations;14 and 2) a determination of a
complaint's plausibility will be "a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."15
Scholars are only beginning to evaluate Iqbal's impact, 16 and much
commentary has focused, in a general sense, on the decision's likely
adverse effect on plaintiffs' chances of overcoming threshold obstacles.17
Whether minority plaintiffs now stand at a particular disadvantage has
not been the subject of extensive analysis.' 8 This Article's core concern

14. Id. at 1950.
15. Id.
16. A search of the Westlaw and Social Science Research Network databases on
March 23, 2010 yielded only twenty law review articles to have discussed Iqbal and its
progeny in depth, including twelve articles from a symposium on Iqbal recently hosted
by the law review at Lewis & Clark Law School. Symposium, Pondering Iqbal, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2010). This count excludes articles resulting from the instant
symposium, hosted by Penn State Dickinson School of Law on March 26, 2010, of which
this Article forms part. See Symposium, Reflections on Iqbal: Discerning Its Rule,
Grappling With Its Implications, 114 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1143 (2010).
17. The law review literature has focused primarily on how the Supreme Court's
two-pronged plausibility pleading standard articulated in Iqbal has upended fifty years of
well-settled notice pleading doctrine. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding
PleadingDoctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009); Robert G. Bone, PlausibilityPleading
Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
(forthcoming 2010); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion
to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 15 (2010). Some
scholarly attention has been paid to Iqbal in relation to specific areas of the law. For
example: whether Iqbal has resulted in higher numbers of motions to dismiss granted
under Rule 12(b)(6), Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao ofPleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal
Matter Empirically?, 59 Am. U. L. REv. 553 (2010); how Iqbal has affected access to
discovery, Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v.
Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2010); what the plausibility standard will
mean in practice, Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable:
Defining the PlausibilityStandardAfter Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 94 MIN. L. REv. 505 (2009); and the constitutionality of Iqbal's heightened
pleading standard under the Seventh Amendment, Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Crashes Rule 8 PleadingStandards on to UnconstitutionalShores, 88 NEB. L. REv. 261
(2009).
18. Even in articles that discuss at length the effects of Iqbal on plaintiffs' access to
the courts, few have explored specifically Iqbal's impact on civil rights plaintiffs.
Patricia Hatamyar's rigorous study of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss under Conley,
Twombly, and Iqbal only mentions in passing that plaintiffs alleging civil rights
violations may be even less likely than before to survive a motion to dismiss after Iqbal's
heightened pleading requirements. Hatamyar, The Tao ofPleading,supra note 23, at 607
(finding that the percentage of Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted in cases alleging civil rights
violations increased from 50% under Conley to 53% under Twombly to 58% under Iqbal).
Other articles allude to Iqbal's deleterious effect on specific classes of plaintiffs, such as
those alleging employment discrimination, but without extensive caselaw discussion.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American
Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 117 (2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right,
Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 413, 415-16 (2009). Some scholars
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is that the Court's reliance on such coarse concepts as "plausibility" and
"common sense"-indeed, its injection of virtually unfettered judicial
subjectivity into the analysis-will adversely impact the odds of success
for minority claimants in general and for Muslims claiming
discrimination in the national security context more than those of the
average plaintiff.
On its face, Iqbal leaves untouched the jurisprudential leitmotiv that
courts must take allegations as true.1 9 However, Iqbal qualifies that
constant adjudicative rule by freeing judges to dismiss those claims their
intuition tells them cannot be true. Alleging a "mere possibility of
misconduct" 20 is no longer sufficient to "show that the pleader is entitled
to relief' under FRCP 8.21 A court can now "choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth." 22 If the allegations are wellpleaded and deserve the assumption of truth, courts should then
23
"determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."
What ultimately mattered in Iqbal-and will influence if not dictate the
outcome of future claims by minority group plaintiffs-is whether, in a
judge's view, the complaint nudges claims of invidious discrimination
"across the line from conceivable to plausible."24
In certain types of cases, particularly ones brought by claimants
belonging to minority groups that are underrepresented on the bench,
Iqbal's two-pronged approach can be expected to effect a significant
erosion of the protections afforded under FRCP 12(b)(6) that pleadings
must be taken as true. For such plaintiffs-especially if they are
Muslims asserting discrimination claims arising from national security
policies-the Iqbal Court signaled to judges that they only have to take
claims as true insofar as they subjectively find those claims to be

have begun to focus on Iqbal's relationship to civil rights litigation, see, e.g., Suzette M.
Malveaux FrontLoading andHeavy Lifting: How Pre-DismissalDiscovery Can Address
the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 15
(2010); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights
Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 157 (2010), but without much elaboration on why
minority plaintiffs are likelier to fail under the Supreme Court's newly-minted
plausibility standard.
19. The Iqbal Court at no point disputed the continued applicability of FRCP
8(a)(2)'s requirement of a short and plain statement detailing factual matter that should,
on its face, be accepted as true. See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting language
from FRCP 8(a)(2) that "a pleading must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief").
20. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1951 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
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believable. By setting "common sense" as a metric by which to
determine plausibility, the Court specifically calls on judges to rely on
views that will likely privilege mainstream over minority perspectives by
virtue of their being "common." Having the common view as the
appropriate standard is unsettling as it can be intrinsically prejudicial in
cases where a minority perception of discrimination undergirds an equal
protection claim.
The dissent in Iqbal seized on the problematic upshot of the
majority's opinion, reminding that Twombly, too, stood for the
proposition "that a court must take the allegations as true, no matter how
skeptical the court may be." 2 5 According to the dissent, dismissal must
require something more than mere skepticism-it is only appropriate
where a court is faced with "allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to
defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the
plaintiffs recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel."26 Citing to
Twombly, the dissent offered a different interpretation of plausibilitythat the plaintiffs alleged facts, assumed to be true, are "suggestive of
illegal conduct." 2 7 The dissent found that the claims at issue in Iqbal not
only fell far short of the realm of fantasy, 28 but they were in fact
inconsistent with legal conduct.29
But the dissent did not address some of the more troubling
implications of the majority's ruling, particularly those concerning the
viability of discrimination lawsuits brought by Muslim plaintiffs and
members of other demographic minority groups. The indeterminacy of
Iqbal's plausibility standard clears a path for unchecked judicial
subjectivity to function as a major determinant of a lawsuit's threshold
viability. Importing Twombly's "flexible 'plausibility standard,'"3 the
25. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting).
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8).
28. In comparing the facts pleaded in Iqbal to "claims about little green men" or a
"recent trip to Pluto," Justice Souter noted, "That is not what we have here [in Iqbal]."
Id.
29. Id. at 1960.
30. See Tymoczko, supra note 23, at 512. Despite these hints in Twombly and Iqbal
of what is needed to suffice as plausible, Tymoczko notes, "the actual meaning of the
plausibility standard, as opposed to the scope of its applicability, remains as important
and as unclear as ever." Id. at 518. One of the problems with how lower courts have
interpreted Twombly and Iqbal is that many have simply substituted the two-prong
analysis from Iqbal for any real inquiry into whether the facts stated raise a plausible
claim. Thus, the courts might simply look at whether or not the facts alleged are
conclusory, which, in and of itself, is a highly subjective determination. Another
problem is that many courts have simply recited key phrases from Twombly and Iqbal
that a "formulaic recitation" is not enough, or that the factual allegations must be more
than "conceivable," in an opinion's section on pleading without any real examination of
what those phrases mean and how they apply to the facts alleged.
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Iqbal Court held that, to avoid dismissal, claimants must "amplify" with
additional facts any claims a judge deems implausible.32 The crucial
plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."33
The Court's reliance at this connection in its reasoning on such
malleable and ill-defined concepts as "plausibility" and "common sense"
essentially invites subjectivity and intuition at the expense of judicial
caution. While judges are uniquely, perhaps supremely competent at
discerning bias, as will be detailed below, their subjective perceptions are
not immune to the distortions that influence individual judgment in the
general population. Judicial outcomes, too, carry the imprint of judges'
individual backgrounds and biases. Where judges' subjectivity is given
virtual free rein, particular classes of plaintiffs and claims are likelier to
bear the impact. Iqbal's shift towards the subjective sets the stage for the
most disturbing passage of the Court's analysis-its association of broad
swathes of immigrants and citizens with terrorists, simply because "the
September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers."34
The complaint alleged that "the [FBI], under the direction of
Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim
men ... as part of its investigation of the events of September 11."35 The
Iqbal plaintiffs also claimed that "[t]he policy of holding postSeptember-1 1th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement
until they were 'cleared' by the FBI was approved by Defendants
ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after
September 11, 2001."3 However, the Court dismisses these allegations:
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim
hijackers who counted themselves members in good standing of al
Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al Qaeda was headed by
another Arab Muslim-Osama bin Laden-and composed in large
part of his Arab Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that
a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain
individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would
31. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
32. Id. The Court noted, "Twombly called for a 'flexible pleading standard, which
obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where
such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible."' Id. (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty,
490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007)). Clearly the Iqbal Court believed this case was one
in which the facts required amplification to meet the threshold of plausibility. Again
drawing upon language from Twombly, the Court continued, "only a complaint that states
a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
33. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
34. Id. at 1951.
35. Complaint 1 47, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 04-CV-1809).
36. Id. at T 69.
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produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though
the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.
On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were
likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain
aliens who were illegally present in the United States and who had
potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts.
As between that "obvious alternative explanation" for the arrests, and
the purposeful, invidious discrimination res ondent asks us to infer,
discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.
The Court sees merely "incidental" disparate impact where others,
particularly those directly affected by such policies, might discern
deliberate, discriminatory and indiscriminate intent to target Arab and
South Asian Muslims broadly in the aftermath of 9/11. The Court credits
an "obvious alternative explanation" for the policy, one that posits in part
that the men had been rounded up "because of their suspected links to the
attacks." Perhaps most interesting at this analytical juncture in the
opinion is that the Court could not have found Iqbal's claims implausible
for the reasons it stated. Indeed, the alternative explanation the Justices
found for the policy does not hold up to scrutiny.
Had there been a "suspected link" between the plaintiff and the men
who were responsible for September 11th, then that would have been a
compelling alternative explanation-it would have founded a legitimate
law enforcement rationale for the policy as applied to Iqbal and others
like him. But there was no such apparent link between the plaintiff and
the men who committed the attacks. Indeed, while the Court vindicates
the FBI in rounding up "aliens who were illegally present in the United
States and who had potential connections to those who committed
terrorist acts,"08 nowhere does the Court further delineate the plaintiffs
One struggles to find the
"suspected link to the attacks."39
commonalities between the plaintiff, others like him who were swept up
in the post-9/11 dragnet, and the 9/11 operatives or their accomplices and
handlers. The Court mentions aliens who were unlawfully present in the
United States, but the men who carried out the 9/11 attacks themselves
all had valid visas.4 0 Thus, while the Court speaks of potential
37.
38.
39.
40.
present

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 1951.
Id.
The nineteen men who carried out the attacks on September 11, 2001, were
in the United States on valid visas, the majority of which were obtained in Saudi

Arabia. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11

COMM'N REPORT 235 (2004). Prior to applying for a U.S. visa, many of the operatives
obtained new "clean" passports to erase information about previous international travel
that might have given U.S. consular officials pause. Id.
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connections to those who committed terrorist acts, on the record before
the Court, the only characteristics the plaintiffs are known to have shared
with the hijackers are their Muslim faith and ethnic background. 4 1 Of
course, faith and ethnicity are but two of the very many components that
can possibly compose individual identity and, more Apropos here, they
are certainly not the most meaningful or probative identifiers of possible
activity on behalf of specified terrorist groups.
What, then, drove the Court's finding of implausibility when it
assessed the plaintiffs claims? By enthroning plausibility as the
inquiry's touchstone, the Court effectively embraced judicial
subjectivity, though it somewhat masked that shift towards the
subjective. The decision rhetorically treats the plausibility of pleadings
as an objectively ascertainable issue of law, promoting the inquiry to an
"abstract" rather than "fact-related" issue of law.42 However, the Court
repeatedly calls upon judges to assess a complaint's plausibility based
upon their own "experience and common sense." 43 That language stands
in interesting contrast to the Court's "expertise and competence"
terminology, employed in an earlier ruling.44 The Iqbal phrasing
connotes individual subjectivity whereas the terms used to guide the
exercise of judicial authority in Boumediene draw on the lexical field of
professional objectivity. In its choice of terms and framing, the Court
enshrines judges' subjective views on plausibility; those opinions now
carry the authority of law with the high court's blessing. The Iqbal
ruling erects a black box where judges will decide what sounds right,
almost intuitively, by gut check, based on "common sense." Claims can
be dismissed because they do not accord with a judge's worldview and
her subjective assessment of what is plausible.
As the following sections illustrate, this development will matter
most in cases involving discrimination claims like Iqbal, where gauging
the plausibility that the defendants acted with discriminatory purpose in
implementing a challenged policy or practice based upon the facts

41. The Iqbal Court repeatedly makes reference to Arab Muslims because the
complaint alleged that the government defendants had classified thousands of Arab
Muslim men as "being of 'high interest' to the government's post-September-11th
investigation by the FBI . . .. " Complaint at 1 48, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. Javaid Iqbal
1. Professor Romero
himself was not Arab, but rather a Pakistani Muslim. Id. at
further details the non-existent nexus between the Iqbal plaintiffs and the individuals and
organizations responsible for September 11th. Victor C. Romero, InterrogatingIqbal:
Intent, Inertia, and (a lack of) Imagination, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1419 (2010).
42. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. The Court notes, "[e]valuating the sufficiency of a
complaint is not a 'fact-based' question of law ..... Id.
43. Id. at 1950.
44. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008).
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alleged will make or break a case at the preliminary stages.45 How the
assessment concludes under Iqbal will depend in large part on what a
judge's common sense tells her about the likelihood that a policymaker's
intent rose to the requisite level of deliberation. Judges' views about
particular groups and about the prevalence of prejudice and
discrimination directed at those groups suddenly take on a central and
acknowledged weight in the judicial calculus-they assume a position
that, at the very least, was not openly recognized or encouraged in the
lead up to Iqbal.46 The ruling gives judges wider latitude to issue
findings in accordance with an inchoate and indeterminate "common
sense" standard that fails to cabin subjectivity, instead of ones articulated
in keeping with more definite metrics. As will be seen below, the
subjective, common sense standard applied by the judiciary will likely
tilt towards mainstream, majority group views that include a dose of
skepticism towards claims of invidious discrimination against minority
groups, particularly unpopular, insular ones.
Majority group skepticism on judges' part, coupled with the stark
informational asymmetries that characterize discrimination claims
generally (and in particular ones arising in the national security context)
raise concerns about minority claimants' chances of success in
discrimination suits. Moreover, that the decisionmaking process now
consecrated by Iqbal's frontal embrace of subjectivity can be almost
inscrutable given that the opaque plausibility standard raises a related
concern that rulings will be more insulated from review or challenge.
For instance, where a judge tautologically declares a claim implausible,
offering little reasoning upon which to hang an appeal, a litigant is left to
punt the plausibility determination to the next set of appellate judges who

45. "Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the ... Fifth
Amendment[], our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the
defendant acted with discriminatory purpose." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (citing
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)). Michael Dorf points out that the Court
in Iqbal acknowledged that the complaint may have alleged misconduct by some of the
lower-level defendants, such as the corrections officers and warden at the facility where
Javaid Iqbal was detained. Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 217, 224 (2010). But as that article notes, at a time when high-ranking Bush
administration officials were ordering coercive interrogation and other abuse at Abu
Ghraib and Guantinamo Bay, it is hardly implausible to posit that the wardens at the
facility where Javaid Iqbal was detained were acting upon orders from higher-ranking
officials. Id. at 224-25.
46. Though beyond the scope of this Article, an interesting discussion could be had
about whether this is a shift for the better, in that it inaugurates transparency where there
was hypocrisy and rhetorical window-dressing about the role played by judges' personal
views in assessing the viability of such claims. After all, courts were not especially
hospitable to non-citizens even before Twombly and Iqbal. See Shoba Wadhia, Business
as Usual, 114 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1485 (2010).
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will likewise offer their subjective views on the matter, unmoored from
any predetermined, concrete benchmarks.
II.

PLAUSIBILITY IS INTHE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: ON THE COLOR OF
PERCEPTION AND THE PITFALLS OF EMBRACING SUBJECTIVITY

In dismissing Javaid Iqbal's allegations of intentional
discrimination, the Supreme Court in Iqbal wrote, "[i]t should come as
no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest
and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the September
11th attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab
Muslims, even though the policy's purpose was to target neither Arabs
nor Muslims." 47 The Iqbal Court opined that the facts, as alleged in the
complaint, described government conduct that was a legitimate law
enforcement response to 9/11.48 According to the majority in Iqbal, the
"obvious alternative explanation" 49 for the indiscriminate surveillance,
arrest, and detention of well over a thousand Arab and South Asian
Muslims post-9/11 was national security. As the dragnet was conducted
for national security purposes, the Iqbal Court accepted that the federal
government acted without purposeful invidious discrimination against a
particular minority group.so
In one breath, the Iqbal Court not only acknowledged that Muslims
were subject to heightened surveillance and monitoring as a result of law
enforcement practices after 9/11, but also condoned the arrest, detention,
and deportation of a large number of Muslim suspects as a necessary
result of a legitimate counterterrorism policy.5 1 According to the Court,
Javaid Iqbal failed to plead a plausible claim of intentional
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1951-52.
51. In the Iqbal majority opinion, Justice Kennedy narrates the factual background
that led to plaintiff Javaid Iqbal's arrest, detention, and subsequent deportation. After
September 11, the FBI questioned more than 1,000 individuals who were suspected of
having ties to terrorist organizations or activities. Id. at 1943. In fact, the exact number
of individuals questioned is unknown, as the Department of Justice stopped counting at
1,200. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER I1 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE
47.

TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATrACKS 1 n.2 (April 2003) (noting that

cumulative totals were discontinued after the number reached 1,200 because the statistics
became too confusing). Of those individuals, 762 were charged with immigration
violations, and 184 were detained as "high interest" suspects. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943.
Iqbal was part of the subset deemed to be of "high interest." Id. Given the paucity of
demonstrably shared characteristics between Iqbal and the men who carried out the
September 11 attacks, one troubling interpretation of the Court's expectation that
suspicion would naturally fall more heavily on Muslims is that religious identity is a
permissible proxy for articulable suspicion.
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discrimination because his complaint did not allege facts that
demonstrated the government defendants acted with a "discriminatory
purpose."52
The Iqbal majority's view, of course, stands in stark contrast to that
of Muslims in the United States who are directly affected by law
enforcement policies after 9/11, and to whom the heightened surveillance
and targeted profiling of one discrete group within the larger American
public seems indeed deliberate and invidious. That the very scenario
dismissed as implausible by the Supreme Court in Iqbal is a tangible and
recurring reality in the Muslim American experience might indicate that
the Court's assessment of whether Javaid Iqbal's discrimination claim
satisfied the subjective plausibility test was colored by the Justices' own
backgrounds, experiences, and views. How the plausibility assessment
can resolve differently by group will be a focus of inquiry in this Section.
A.

Discriminationand the Muslim American Experience

Overwhelmingly, Muslim Americans say that discrimination and
prejudice because of their Muslim identity is the biggest problem they
face in the United States.54 Worries that are typically ranked high by the
general public-such as economic difficulties and job stress-are only
cited as top concerns by 2% of Muslims. 5 5 Polls conducted after 9/11
show that Muslim Americans' fears of discrimination extend even
beyond the national security context to everyday experiences. For
example, one recent poll found that 37% of Muslim Americans were
very or somewhat worried about not being hired for a job because of
their ethnicity or religion,56 compared to 26% of African American men
and 3% of white men.5 7
More generally, polls reflect that Muslim Americans are especially
concerned about racial and ethnic profiling on national security grounds
after 9/11. Over 50% of Muslims surveyed in a recent national poll
52. Id. at 1948 ("As between that 'obvious alternative explanation' for the arrests,
and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is
not a plausible conclusion.").
53. The term "Muslim American" is employed here and throughout in its broadest
possible sense-to wit, it is not restricted to Muslim citizens of the United States but is
meant to encompass all Muslims in the United States.
54. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SURVEY, MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND
MosTLY MAINSTREAM 36 (2007) [hereinafter MUSLIM AMERICANSI.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 37.
57. Press release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, New Gallup Poll on
Employment Discrimination Shows Problems, Progress 40 Years After Founding of
EEOC (Dec. 8, 2005), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-805.cfm.
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believe that the government singles out Muslims for increased
surveillance and monitoring, and 30% of Muslims who had traveled by
airplane in the last year reported being selected by airport security for
additional inspection or questioning. 59 Beyond heightened surveillance
and monitoring, Muslim Americans reported many incidents of
perceived or actual animus after 9/11.
When asked if they bad
experienced racial discrimination in the past year, 26% of Muslims
responded that people had acted as if they were suspicious of them, 60 and
15% reported they had been called offensive names.
By contrast, far from being seen as victims of discrimination,
surveys of the general American public confirm that Muslim Americans
are widely viewed with distrust and that anti-Muslim sentiment has
burgeoned in the United States post-9/1 1. A 2004 poll found that 47% of
respondents believed that Islam is more likely to encourage violence
compared to other religions,62 and 44% agreed that the government
should subject Muslim Americans to additional scrutiny, such as
mandatory registration with the federal government, targeted profiling of
citizens based on their Muslim or Middle Eastern background, increased
surveillance of mosques, and use of undercover law enforcement agents
in mosques and Islamic civic organizations. Even five years after 9/11,
a significant percentage of Americans continued to favor additional
security measures for Muslims as a means to prevent future attacks. In
response to a poll conducted in 2006, 39% of respondents said they
favored requiring Muslim Americans to carry special identification,
while 41% believed Muslim Americans should undergo more extensive
airport security checks before being allowed to board a flight.
MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 61, at 37.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 38.
61. Id.
62. Erik C. Nesbit & James Shanahan, MSRG Special Report: Restrictions on Civil
Liberties, Views of Islam, & Muslim Americans, Cornell University Media & Research
Group (December 2004), available at http://www.yuricareport.com/Civil%20Rights/
CornellMuslimReportCivilRights.pdf.
6 3. Id.
64. Lydia Saad, Anti-Muslim Sentiments Fairly Commonplace: Four in ten
Americans admitfeelingprejudiceagainstMuslims, Gallup Organization, Aug. 10, 2006,
available
at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/24073/antimuslim-sentiments-fairlycommonplace.aspx. Interestingly, the Gallup Poll found that respondents who personally
knew a Muslim were less likely to be in favor of measures that restricted Muslim
Americans' civil liberties than respondents who did not have any Muslim acquaintances.
Id. In a curious display of duality, anti-Muslim sentiment is also widely recognized by
the general American public as a reality for many Muslims-a 2009 poll found that 58%
of Americans believed Muslims in the United States face a lot of discrimination. PEW
58.

FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, SURVEY, VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS SIMILARITIES AND
DIFFERENCES: MUSLIMS WIDELY SEEN AS FACING DISCRIMINATION

5 (2009). A separate
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Taken together, the above statistics teach us that Muslim Americans
would assay the plausibility of Javaid Iqbal's claims differently from the
general public and-as Iqbal reflected-from the Justices. Views on the
likelihood of discrimination as a general proposition or in a given
instance, and perspectives on whether a particular group is a victim of
discrimination or a source of terrorist peril-which perspectives, in turn,
impact plausibility assessments of discrimination-vary widely across
groups of observers. This data raises concerns that judges, too, might
view as implausible claims of invidious discrimination advanced by
minority group claimants and might regard Muslim claimants in
particular not as victims but as threats.65 The concerns would be
mitigated ifjudges, by virtue of their training, expertise, and competence,
or due to their personal backgrounds, are less likely to be influenced by
the factors that shape the perceptions of common citizens. Accordingly,
in the next stage of this inquiry, the focus will be on whether we can
expect the judiciary to escape the phenomenon of majority group
skepticism and suspicion towards discrimination claims by Muslims.
B.

JudicialDiversity and the Color ofPerception

The majority in Iqbal dismissed as implausible what many if not
most Muslim Americans regard as incontrovertible-that the impact of
post-9/11 law enforcement sweeps on the Muslim community was
anything but incidental. Would the Court have assessed the plausibility
of Javaid Iqbal's claims differently had one of the Justices been Muslim,
or if more of them claimed racial, religious, national, or gender
backgrounds that made discrimination a more prominent part of their
lives? Is background discernibly relevant to judicial outcomes and, if so,
what does the present composition of our federal judiciary allow us to
foretell about how particular types of claims brought by certain groups
might fare under the subjectivity standard ushered in by Iqbal?

poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2010 found that the American general
public believed that Latinos and African Americans face significantly less discrimination
than Muslim Americans. According to the poll, 23% of the public said that Latinos faced
a lot of discrimination, and 18% said that African Americans did. See PEw RESEARCH
CENTER, SURVEY, A YEAR AFTER OBAMA'S ELECTION: BLACKS UPBEAT ABOUT BLACK

PROGRESS, PROSPECTS 4 (2010). The polls did not reach whether discrimination affecting
Muslim Americans was viewed as unfair or unwarranted, which might reconcile these
poll results with those documenting rampant anti-Muslim sentiment in the same
population.
65. As an aside, this data also informs analysis of whether federal officials, in
developing and implementing the law enforcement policies at issue in Iqbal, were
impelled in part by the ambient distrust of Muslims as a group that has been observed in
the American public at large.

IMPLAUSIBLE REALITIES

2010]

1.

1459

Judicial Subjectivity

Even in the absence of an indeterminate legal standard giving free
rein to judicial subjectivity, judicial assessments are not impervious to
the influence of judges' backgrounds and attendant perceptions. Recent
studies show that a judge's background-especially race and genderimpacts judicial outcomes, both in individual cases and overall decisionmaking on the bench. 6 For example, one study found that plaintiffs who
appeared before African American judges with a racial discrimination
claim were likely to be successful 46% of the time, while similarly
situated plaintiffs who appeared before judges of other races considered
together, including white judges, were likely to win only 22% of the
time.
Another study found that African American judges found in
favor of African American plaintiffs in discrimination cases 50% of the
66. The study of how the race and gender of individual judges impact judicial
decision-making is a relatively new area of legal inquiry. Much of the research in this
field has focused on racial disparities in criminal sentencing based on the race of the
defendant. See David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in their Treatment of Race?
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/2033 (finding that
African American judges appeared to sentence defendants of different races to sentences
of comparable length, while white judges exhibited greater disparities in sentencing
determinations between white and African American defendants); see also David B.
Mustard, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S.
Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & EcoN. 285 (2001) (concluding that despite federal sentencing
guidelines intended to eliminate disparities in sentencing, unexplained disparities in
sentencing lengths exist between defendants of different races); compare Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Does UnconsciousRacial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1195 (2009) (empirical study finding that judges harbor biases similar to general
population, that these biases can influence judicial decisionmaking, but that judges can
compensate for influence of biases). Until recently, there had not been significant
numbers of female judges or African American, Asian American, Latino, or Native
American judges on either the federal or state benches to draw any meaningful
correlations between a judge's gender or race and the impact it may have on how a judge
decides a case. Early studies in this area indicated no significant differences in case
outcomes when selected by a judge's race or gender. See Theresa M. Beiner, What Will
Diversity on the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 138 (1999). One
reason for this may simply have been the statistically small number of judges and the
futility of making generalizations from an unrepresentative survey. Another may have
been the single-minded focus of the researchers in factoring out all variables except for
the judge's race and gender. Id. For example, one study that compared the voting
records of assumed liberal judges-based on the political affiliation of the appointing
president, in that study President Carter-found no meaningful difference in how male
judges ruled compared to female judges and African American judges. Id. at 139.
Again, the narrowness of the study may have preordained the result. After all, it is not
wholly surprising that white male judges appointed by Carter would vote similarly to
female judges or African American judges in favor of plaintiffs in sex or race
discrimination claims, given President Carter's overall liberal bent.
67. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical
Analysis ofRacial Harassment Claims, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1117, 1141 (2009).
68. Id.
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time, while white judges found in favor of African American plaintiffs
only 10% of the time.6 9
Race plays a role in how judges evaluate the fairness of the courts,
as well. For example, when white and black judges were asked whether
black litigants are treated fairly in the justice system, 83% of white
judges believed that they were, while only 18% of black judges shared
that belief.70 The dramatic discrepancies in these numbers suggest that,
as a group, African American and white judges perceive discrimination
differently.71 Particularly in discrimination cases, judges can be expected
to draw heavily upon their own background and experiences to determine
whether a given claim is plausible.72
Perhaps predictably based on the above, it also appears that the
presence of a range of backgrounds and perspectives would improve
overall fairness and impartiality in decision-making beyond individual
case outcomes. In other words, though discretion and subjectivity will
always play a role in the judicial function, the system more closely
approaches its aspiration of impartiality where unrepresentative judicial
subjectivity is kept in check through representation of a broader range of
judicial subjectivities. As part of a "panel effect," diversity on the bench
contributes to more dialogue between judges in judicial deliberations, 73
with each judge contributing their perspective as a "situated actor[]
who ... see[s] the world through the lens of their own knowledge and
experiences." 74 Studies have shown that the panel effect on judicial
outcomes for plaintiffs is positive overall. For example, one study found
that male judges were twice as likely to find in favor of plaintiffs in
sexual harassment cases-with that rate jumping from 16% to 35 0/-if a
female judge was also on the panel.75

69. Beiner, supra note 73, at 139.
70. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and
Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 436 (2000).
71. Chew & Kelley, supra note 74, at 1156.
72. Id. at 1121.
73. See Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmakingin the FederalAppellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761 (2005).
74. Ifill, supra note 77, at 433.
75. Chew & Kelley, supra note 74, at 1778. Of course, diversity can be
manipulated, so, while remaining duly wary of diversity in superficial appearance, one
objective could be to strive for the inclusion of a representative range of backgrounds and
viewpoints. See, e.g., ANGELA D. DLLARD, GUESS WHO's COMING TO DINNER Now?
(2001) (on the conservative diversity movement); Victor C. Romero, Are Filipinas
Asians or Latinas?: Reclaiming the Anti-subordination Objective of Equal Protection
after Grutter and Gratz, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765 (2005) (arguing that the only real value
of diversity is to promote antisubordination).
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Composition of the Federal Bench

If background does influence judicial outcomes, then the
composition of our federal judiciary takes on heightened importance in
discrimination cases, particularly where-as under Iqbal-the resolution
of vital issues is left to subjective judicial discretion. Of the 1,280 sitting
judges on the federal bench in January 2010, 80% were male and 20%
were female.76 Approximately 85% were white, 9% African American,
5% Hispanic, 1% Asian American, and one judge was Native
American.
Combined, these results yield a bench that is 69% white
male and 15% white female, with the remaining 16% capturing all other
groups combined.
While no official statistics are maintained on judges' religious
backgrounds, legal scholars studying the role of judges' personal
religious affiliations on First Amendment claims found that
approximately 26% of the federal judiciary were Catholic, 37%
Protestant, 6.3% Baptist, 9% were from other Christian denominations,
13% Jewish, 3% were "other" (such as Mormon, Baha'i, and Unitarian),
and 5.5% of judges had no religious affiliation.78 Notably, no judges
identified in the study were found to be Muslim. 79
Judges
Biographical
Database,
Judicial
Center,
Federal
76. Federal
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/judges-frm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). Official
data on the federal judiciary is collected by the Federal Judicial Center. Information about
judges' demographic information, such as age, race/ethnicity, and gender (but not sexual
orientation) is collected from forms completed by the judges during their appointment to
the bench. This information is stored in the Federal Judges Biographical Database, an
online repository of information about former and current federal judges. The
Biographical Database can be queried by several different fields, including court type,
Additional
nominating president, and status as an active versus senior judge.
biographical information about each sitting judge is available in narrative form. These
biographical sketches include date and place of birth, educational background, and
employment prior to service on the federal bench. It should be noted at this juncture that
President Barack Obama's nominations since he assumed office have been more diverse
than the current federal bench which, over time, may improve gender, racial and sexual
orientation diversity.
77. Id.
78. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searchingfor the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: an
EmpiricalStudy ofReligious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 576-78 (2004).
79. See id. The study also tracked the religious affiliation of claimants and the
success rates of religious accommodation claims brought by members of various
religious groups. Of the approximately 1,200 First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
claims examined, the study found that Muslim plaintiffs filed 14.5% of those claims. Id.
at 564-66. However, Muslim plaintiffs had one of the lowest rates of success in winning
religious accommodation claims, at around 5%. Id. at 566. According to the authors of
the study, religious groups that occupy near-mainstream status in American societysuch as Catholics and Baptists-understandably would have low rates of success on
religious accommodation claims as their religious practices were already commonly
accepted. Id. at 564. This does not explain why Muslims, whose religious beliefs do not
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The federal bench is remarkably homogenous compared to the
population of the United States as a whole. While the lack of diversity in
the judiciary may in part correspond to the lack of diversity in the legal
profession more generally, this feature fuels concern around how
minority plaintiffs might fare post-Iqbal. The paucity of female and nonwhite judges signifies that Muslim plaintiffs' and other discrimination
claims will be heard by judges who are less likely to have personal
knowledge of or exposure to daily discrimination.80
C.

Iqbal and the Pitfalls ofEmbracingSubjectivity

Even in the absence of jurisprudence inaugurating reliance on
nearly unfettered judicial subjectivity, judicial judgment is not entirely
insulated from judges' personal backgrounds and views. The bench's
make-up, coupled with the prevalence of anti-Muslim sentiment in
American society, raise concerns that federal judges, just like the Justices
in Iqbal, would be less likely than affected or minority groups to credit
invidious discrimination claims brought by Muslim plaintiffs. This
becomes particularly problematic with Iqbal, which consecrates
unfettered judicial subjectivity in making dispositive plausibility
assessments at the threshold stage, yielding an outcome where it is now
easier for judges to dismiss claims as implausible without more. That
judicial perspectives are likely to lean a particular way given the present
state of bench diversity is one thing. By establishing subjectivity, Iqbal
privileges particular perspectives through the composition of the
judiciary, promoting those perspectives to the rank of law.
Discrimination claims are particularly exposed by the Iqbal decision
because judges, in evaluating the threshold viability of such claims, must
now find it plausible that official actors engaged in invidious
discrimination directed at Muslim plaintiffs and, generally, plaintiffs who

have near-mainstream status in the United States, fared so poorly in their religious
accommodation claims. The authors do not offer any conclusions for why this
discrepancy exists, but one possible explanation is the relative lack of judicial diversity
and total absence of Muslim judges from the federal bench combined with the prevalence
of anti-Muslim sentiment in the general American public.
80. Because people of color have historically been underrepresented in the legal
profession, the American Bar Association stood up a Commission on Racial and Ethnic
Diversity in the Profession. ABA, About Legal Profession, http://new.abanet.org/centers/
diversity/Pages/AboutLegalProfession.aspx (last visited April 14, 2010). Again, as noted
"non-whites" account for nearly 96 million people in the United States, approximately a
third of the total population. See supra note 7. Of course, this analysis and the
underlying data cannot predict outcomes in particular cases. Iqbal itself reminds of that
reality-the only justice of color sided with the majority and the members of religious
minorities on the Court, including the sole woman, did not produce a determinative
"panel effect."
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happen to be people of color. The research discussed above raises
questions about the likelihood that a judge will take the view that official
conduct is driven by invidious discrimination when that judge is not a
member of a minority group, when her views of Muslims or other
minority groups in America may well be negative (indeed, when she may
on some level regard that community as a potential threat), and when she
has been granted carte blanche by the Supreme Court to go with her
subjective, gut instinct on plausibility.
In Iqbal, the outcome was that the Court found it implausible that
Javaid Iqbal-and, by extension, other Arab and South Asian Muslimswere victims of invidious discrimination. The Court deemed it more
likely that they were legitimate targets in law enforcement's response to
an existential national security threat. But discrimination claims brought
by Muslims might not be the only ones affected by the new standard
Iqbal sets. The Iqbal Court's reliance on "common sense" calls attention
to our judiciary's composition and to studies documenting the
constitutive role of identity in subjective perception and, by extension, in
the bare plausibility assessments judges must now make. Iqbal thus
raises serious concern that its establishment of a subjective plausibility
standard entrenches majority group skepticism towards discrimination
claims more broadly, to the possible detriment of lawsuits brought by
members of minority groups generally, which can now be more readily
dismissed. In that sense, the Iqbal decision risks arming extant prejudice
against Muslim Americans and other minority groups by giving
subjective viewpoints the force of law at the critical, incipient stages of
civil rights litigation.8 '
A review of emerging caselaw should help test whether the
expectations articulated above are borne out thus far and whether Iqbal
indeed poses a particularly acute danger to unlawful discrimination
claims brought by members of minority groups.

81. That Iqbal casts judges in a fact-finding role traditionally reserved for the jury is
also troubling, not least because a randomly drawn jury would yield a more diverse and
representative range of outlooks than a randomly drawn individual judge or panel of
judges. More generally, scholars have noted the tension between Iqbal and the Seventh
Amendment. See Klein, supra note 23, at 262 ("[Ilt is unconstitutional to give a judge
the power to weigh the factual heft of a complaint at the outset of a civil case and to
dismiss it as insufficient."). Klein notes that this conflict exists after Twombly and Iqbal
given the Supreme Court's understanding of what facts are sufficient to meet the
plausibility standard of pleading. Id. at 273. A determination of whether an allegation is
conclusory, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, which is the first prong of the Iqbal standard, and
then whether the claim is plausible, id at 1950, require judges to weigh the evidence and
make a judgment on its merits. Klein, supra note 23, at 274.
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III. IQBAL'S PROGENY: How SUBJECTIVE JUDICIAL ASSESSMENTS OF
PLAUSIBILITY HURT MINORITY CLAIMANTS
While it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions about the overall
impact of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, emerging trends suggest that Iqbal's
injection of increased judicial subjectivity into the pleading analysis has
already worked to the detriment of minority plaintiffs. According to one
recent study, the rates of motions to dismiss granted, both with and
without leave to amend, increased from 50% under Conley to 53% under
Twombly to 58% under Iqbal for civil rights cases filed in federal district
courts.82 Beyond the numbers, Iqbal's progeny illustrates a clear and
distinct departure from decades of well-established pleading standards.
The Conley pleading standards operated-at least in theory-to screen
82. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 553, 607 (2010). Other empirical studies that tracked
dismissal rates pre- and post-Iqbal have reached differing results. For example, an
electronically-generated analysis of motions to dismiss granted under FRCP Rule 12 by
the Federal Judicial Center showed little to no difference in rates of dismissal for the
seven months prior to Twombly compared to the seven months after Iqbal in both civil
FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
rights employment cases and other civil rights cases.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL INFORMATION ON MOTIONS TO

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Motions%20to%20
TwomblylIqbal,
RE
DISMISS
Dismiss.pdf According to the FJC report, the monthly average rate of motions to
dismiss granted during the seven-month period prior to Twombly was 48% in civil rights
employment cases, compared to 44% during the seven-month period after Iqbal for those
same types of cases. For other civil rights cases, the monthly average dismissal rate of
67% for the seven-month period prior to Twombly was exactly the same as the dismissal
rate for the seven-month period after Iqbal. A number of methodological differences
between the Hatamyar and FJC studies may explain the differing results. First,
Hatamyar's analysis focused only on motions to dismiss granted under Rule 12(b)(6).
Hatamyar, supra, at 584. The FJC study aggregated dismissal rates for all motions to
dismiss granted under Rule 12, including Rule 12(b)(1-5) and (7). FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
supra. Second, Hatamyar compared district court opinions during the two years
immediately preceding Twombly, the two years between Twombly and Iqbal, and the
three months following Iqbal. Hatamyar, supra, at 584-85. The FJC study compared
dismissal rates between the seven-month period prior to Twombly and the seven-month
period immediately after Iqbal. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra. Iqbal, of course, is too

recently decided to draw firm conclusions based on dismissal rates. As more time passes,
trends will crystallize. It is also unclear whether either study controls or accounts for the
possible effect of self-restraint on the part of plaintiffs' attorneys. In other words,
lawyers cognizant of the heightened Iqbal standard may refrain from bringing certain
lawsuits they would have initiated pre-Iqbal. That possibility may account for stability in
dismissal rates across periods. A third and final empirical study that must be mentioned
in this connection is Professor Reinert's forthcoming, herculean exploration of the key
assumption underlying much of the debate regarding heightened pleading standardsnamely, that heightened pleading will keep out meritless lawsuits that would have been
permitted to move forward pre-Iqbal. See Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of
Heightened Pleading,IND. L.J. (forthcoming) (demonstrating through novel retrospective
empirical analysis that pleadings that would survive under notice pleading standard but
not heightened standard are just as likely to be ultimately successful as those cases that
would survive heightened pleading).
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meritless lawsuits that offered no possibility of redress.83 After Twombly
and Iqbal, however, cases that potentially have merit but lack ample facts
or evidence at the pleading stage due to informational asymmetries are
subject to the same fate.84 Since Iqbal, what constitutes ample facts, and
whether those facts appear plausible, are matters left to the presiding
judge's discretion-whereas one judge may subjectively regard a claim
as fanciful or implausible, another may permit a similar claim to proceed.
Through an analysis of discrimination cases decided since Iqbal,
this section will further explore whether emerging caselaw confirms that
Iqbal's plausibility standard enhances the potential for judicial outcomes
to hinge on a judge's personal outlook or temperament, to the detriment
of Muslim and other minority claimants. The caselaw survey below is
neither exhaustive nor empirical, but rather looks to the language of
key judicial opinions to discern what underlying perspectives and biases
emerge when judges assess facts and allegations in a complaint for
plausibility. The selected cases arise from claims brought by Muslim
plaintiffs ensnared in post-9/11 counterterrorism policies like the ones
that founded Javaid Iqbal's claim of discrimination, but the set also
includes rulings suggesting that Iqbal's impact goes well beyond socalled national security cases, reaching other discrimination claims,
especially ones alleging racial discrimination.

83. See Robert G. Bone, PlausibilityPleadingRevisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 24,
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1467799).
84. Id. Professor Bone also points out the mistake of lumping Twombly and Iqbal
together or assuming that Iqbal is merely an extension of Twombly beyond the antitrust
context. He writes:
[M]y point is that Twombly implements a thin screening model, while Iqbal
implements a thick screening model. The two models are different in theory,
support different pleading standards, and invite different attitudes toward
screening. Many commentators lump Iqbal and Twombly together. They treat
Iqbal as just another application of Twombly, one in which the plausibility
standard is applied outside the antitrust field. This is a mistake. Iqbal's
screening approach is qualitatively different than Twombly's, and it is
important to understand the differences in order to appreciate Twombly's
virtues distinct from Iqbal's vices.
Id. at 24-25.
85. For a comprehensive summary of post-Iqbal caselaw organized by federal
circuit, see Review of Case Law Applying Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, an ongoing survey of how appellate and district courts have treated the plausibility
pleading standard from Twombly and Iqbal. The report was prepared and is maintained
by Andrea Kuperman, law clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, chair of the Judicial
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. It is available on the Federal
Judiciary website. See U.S. Courts, Federal Rulemaking, Caselaw Study on post-Iqbal
20
Cases, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Memo%20re%20pleading%20standards%20by%
circuit.pdf.
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Iqbal and NationalSecurity

Easily overlooked in discussion of Iqbal's heightened pleading
standard is the case's historical backdrop-the post-9/11 dragnet that
resulted in the surveillance, arrest, and detention of hundreds of Arabs,
South Asians, Muslims, and those perceived to belong to those groups.
The policies of that era gave rise to numerous legal challenges
comparable to Javaid Iqbal's. How those challenges have fared in
Iqbal's wake sheds some light on the odds of success that closely
situated claimants-Muslims reacting to the perceived or real
discriminatory application of counterterrorism policies-can expect will
obtain going forward.
1.

Arar v. Ashcroft

Iqbal set the stage for federal courts to dismiss as implausible other
claims raised by Arab, Muslim, and South Asian plaintiffs as a result of
civil rights violations stemming from post-9/11 national security policies.
On June 30, 2008, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal, a panel
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Arar v. Ashcroft, in
which it considered whether Maher Arar, a Muslim Canadian citizen
who was detained in New York under the U.S. government's
extraordinary rendition program and rendered to Syria for
incommunicado imprisonment torture and interrogation, had sufficiently
pled a plausible claim under the Torture Victim Protection Act and
Bivens.87 Judge Cabranes, writing for himself and Judge McLaughlin in
the majority opinion, held that while Arar alleged sufficient facts to show
that the Second Circuit had personal jurisdiction over the federal
defendants, who included former Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI
Director Mueller,88 the pleadings overall did not state a claim under the
TVPA 89 or Bivens.90
86. See discussion supra Section II and notes 54-58. Iqbal has drawn comparisons
to various infamous Supreme Court decisions made during wartime, such as Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, FirstKorematsu and
Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court's Disregard
for Claims of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 5,
availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1478787).
87. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated and superseded on
rehearingen banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). It bears emphasis that Arar is not a
discrimination case, though it offers potent illustration of the problems Muslim and other
minority plaintiffs are likely to face under Iqbal plausibility, to include the standard's
expansiveness beyond the pure discrimination context.
88. Arar, 532 F.3d at 174. Judge Cabranes noted that the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari on June 16, 2008, to consider the appropriate pleading standard in
Iqbal, in which the Second Circuit had concluded that Javaid Iqbal had set forth a
plausible claim. Id. at 174 n. 11. Analogizing to its reasoning in Iqbal, the Second
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On rehearing en banc, seven judges affirmed the dismissal of Arar's
complaint for failure to state a claim under either the TVPA or Bivens
despite his detailed allegations of unconstitutional detention, denial of
access to counsel, rendition to Syria, and subsequent torture while
imprisoned there.9 ' The brief en banc majority opinion agreed with
many of the rationales offered by the three-judge panel for the dismissal
of Arar's claims under the TVPA for jurisdictional reasons 92 and under
Bivens for restraint in devising new remedies. 93 However, in a departure
from the earlier panel decision, the en banc majority drew upon key
language in Iqbal to conclude that Arar's complaint was also insufficient
to satisfy the plausibility threshold. According to the majority in the en
banc opinion, the complaint's fatal defect was that it failed to name
specific defendants alleged to have engaged in a violation of Arar's
constitutional rights.94 In justifying dismissal of his complaint, the
majority concluded, "Arar alleges (in passive voice) that his requests to
make phone calls 'were ignored,' and that 'he was told' that he was not
entitled to a lawyer, but he fails to link these denials to any defendant,
named or unnamed." 95 According to the majority, Arar's complaint
failed to state a claim because he did not attribute instances of
misconduct to specifically named defendants.96
The four dissenters-Judges Calabresi, Pooler, Sack, and Parkernoted the irony of requiring Arar to name his defendants when his
allegations included being "held incommunicado"97 in a highly secret
rendition program: "It should not be forgotten that the full name of the

Circuit concluded that Arar alleged sufficient facts to make out a primafacie showing of
personal jurisdiction over the federal defendants. Id. at 175.
89. Id. at 175-76.
90. Id. at 190.
91. 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for certiorarifiled, Arar, 585 F.3d
559 (Feb. 1, 2010) (No. 09-923).
92. Arar, 532 F.3d at 176 ("Nowhere, however, does [Arar] contend that defendants
possessed any power under Syrian law, that their allegedly culpable actions resulted from
the exercise of power under Syrian law, or that they would have been unable to undertake
these culpable actions had they not possessed such power.").
93. Id. at 177 ("By asking us to devise a new Bivens damages action for alleged
violations of the substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment, Arar
effectively invites us to disregard the clear instructions of the Supreme Court by
extending Bivens not only to a new context, but to a new context requiring the courts to
intrude deeply into the national security policies and foreign relations of the United
States.").
94. 585 F.3d at 569 (majority opinion).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Arar, 585 F.3d at 616 (dissenting opinion).
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Bivens case itself is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau ofNarcotics."98 The dissent went on to note:
We doubt that Iqbal requires a plaintiff to obtain his abusers'

business cards in order to state a civil rights claim. Put conversely,
we do not think that Iqbal implies that federal government miscreants
may avoid Bivens liability altogether through the simple expedient of
wearing hoods while inflicting injury.99
However, that is precisely what occurred in Arar. The names of the
federal officials who ordered and implemented Arar's detention and
rendition under the government's extraordinary rendition program were
kept classified pursuant to the State Secrets privilege, 00 while the faces
of those who carried out the policy remained hooded. Because of the
stark informational asymmetry-with Arar unable to obtain critical bits
of information given the circumstances of his detention-he ultimately
was left with no remedy.
Writing in a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Parker pointed out
that Arar stated as many facts as could reasonably be expected for a
person held in detention under a highly secretive rendition program and
that the misconduct alleged should have been sufficient to state a claim
under Iqbal's "context-specific" plausibility standard.'o' According to
Judge Parker-and consistent with the analysis in this Article-Iqbal's
flaw was the opportunity it presented for judges to insert "judicial
experience and common sense" and their own "obvious alternative
explanations" to assess whether a claim was sufficiently plausible to
make out unconstitutional conduct.10 2 Judge Parker criticized the Iqbal
majority for substituting its own beliefs on the plausibility of Javaid
Iqbal's discrimination claim: "Apparently having their own views about
the defendants' state of mind, the majority [of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Iqbal] simply found Iqbal's discrimination claim incredible."' 0 3 The en
banc majority in Arar found Maher Arar's claims of rendition and torture
similarly incredible, despite his detailed and carefully-worded allegations
of misconduct. Liberally applying Iqbal to Arar's complaint, the Arar
majority did not consider that limited discovery might have uncovered
the identity of some of the unnamed defendants and that Arar's
allegations themselves might be taken as plausible, given everything that
had at that point been revealed about the U.S. government's Rendition,
98.

Id. at 591 (emphasis in original).

99. Id. at 592.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 575-76 (majority opinion).
Id. at 616-17.
Id. at 617.
Arar, 585 F.3d at 617 (dissenting opinion).
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Detention and Interrogation program, even if the misconduct was not
attributable to specific actors at an early stage in the litigation.
2.

Ibrahim v. DepartmentofHomeland Security

Iqbal's embrace of judicial subjectivity appears to have affected the
viability of more prosaic discrimination claims in national security
contexts less sensational than the extraordinary rendition and torture
alleged in Arar. In Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security, the
Northern District of California dismissed a complaint filed by Rahinah
Ibrahim, a Muslim Malaysian citizen who was detained at San Francisco
International Airport and denied boarding on a flight because her name
was on the No Fly List.104 Alleging discrimination based on race and
religion, Ibrahim sought damages from United Airlines, the San
Francisco Police Department, and several federal defendants for her
unlawful detention at the airport, which included being forced to remove
her religious headscarf in front of a group of men during a search. 05
Ibrahim also sought injunctive relief for her name to be removed from
the No Fly List.'0 6 While the district court allowed Ibrahim's injunctive
relief claim to proceed, 0 7 it dismissed her damages claim under the
heightened pleading standard in Iqbal.08
104. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 06-00545, 2009 WL 2246194, at *2
(N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009).
105. Id. at *10.
106. Id. at *9.
107. Id. Ibrahim's procedural history warrants further discussion. On August 18,
2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal of Ibrahim's
complaints against some of the named defendants and remanded the case to the Northern
District Court of California. Ibrahim, 538 F.3d 1250, 1259 (9th Cir. 2008). Although
Judge Kozinski, writing for the majority, did not explicitly state the pleading standard
used, the decision appears to have been based on Conley. See id. at 1258-59. Before the
Northern District issued an opinion on the remanded case, the Supreme Court decided
Iqbal. Under Iqbal, on remand, the District Court dismissed Ibrahim's damages claims
for discrimination based on race and religious background, but allowed her Fourth
Amendment claims against some of the state defendants to proceed. Ibrahim, 2009 WL
2246194, at *12. In allowing a subset of her claims to proceed, Ibrahim could seek
discovery as to the entire incident, including information regarding her placement on the
No Fly List. Id. at *1. In an order dated November 19, 2009, Judge Alsup of the
Northern District of California held that under the Department of Homeland Security's
Touhy regulations, which govern disclosure of agency documents and information in
legal proceedings, Ibrahim could seek discovery from former federal defendants against
whom Ibrahim's claims had been dismissed in an earlier District Court decision.
Ibrahim, No. 06-00545, 2009 WL 4021757, at *1-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2009).
However, Ibrahim could not enforce interrogatories or document requests against the
former federal defendants as they were no longer parties to the lawsuit. Id. at *3. On
December 17, 2009, Judge Alsup again considered what information the former federal
defendants were required to disclose after receiving a refusal from the former defendants
to hand over "sensitive security information" (SSI) about the watch lists compiled by the
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According to the district court, Ibrahim's allegations that she was
unlawfully detained because she was Muslim and a citizen of Malaysia
were "conclusory and not enough to allow [her] to proceed with her
discrimination claims ... under Iqbal."'0 9 Finding that the facts alleged
did not plausibly sustain a claim that Ibrahim was arrested and detained
"because of and not merely in spite of' her being a Malaysian Muslim, 0
the court noted that the complaint lacked additional facts, such as
derogatory statements made by the defendants about Ibrahim's religious
or ethnic background, to show that they acted with discriminatory
intent.'1 " The court expressed its discomfort with the heightened
pleading threshold in Iqbal that could result in meritorious claims being
dismissed unfairly: "A good argument can be made that the Iqbal
standard is too demanding. Victims of discrimination and profiling will
often not have specific facts to plead without the benefit of discovery.
District judges, however, must follow the law as laid down by the

Supreme Court."I 12
While its reluctance to dismiss Ibrahim's complaint is laudable and
its critique of the new pleading standard perspicacious, the district
court's application of Iqbal's indeterminate standard nonetheless
powerfully illustrates the hazards of unchecked judicial subjectivity in
threshold viability determinations. In this district court's view, barring
some overt act of discrimination, such as a derogatory statement,
Ibrahim's claim that she was deliberately searched and detained because
she was Muslim remained implausible. The court failed to see how
forcing a Muslim woman to remove her religious headscarf in front of
male strangers-a measure that can seem restrained or disproportionate
depending on which side of the headscarf one finds oneself-could be
taken to provide some evidence of the requisite discriminatory intent. 113
Ibrahim's headscarf was, after all, a thin piece of fabric that posed no
obstacle to scanning, wanding, or patdown searches, the measures
Transportation Security Administration. Ibrahim, No. 06-00545, 2009 WL 5069133, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009). The District Court finally resolved the discovery impasse
by issuing an order against the former federal defendants to produce the information
classified as SSI under Section 525(d) of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, which requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
release SSI documents when a lawful request is made for its public release. Id. at *9-10
(quoting Dep't of Homeland Sec. Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295,
§ 525(d), 120 Stat. 1355 (2007)). DHS may refuse to release SSI if they demonstrate that
one of the exceptions to disclosure under the Act applies. Id. at * 10.
108. Ibrahim, 2009 WL 2246194, at *10.
109. Id. at *9.
110. Id. at *10.
111. Id.
112. Ibrahim, 2009 WL 2246194, at *10.
113. Id.
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normally used before requiring individuals to take off other items of
clothing implicating personal modesty.
According to the court, however, removal of Ibrahim's headscarf
could only plausibly evince discrimination if the officer had permanently
deprived her of the scarf or if Ibrahim had been denied a request to be
searched privately.1 14 What that discussion misses is how airline
officials who removed Ibrahim's headscarf, even if only momentarily,
did so with complete disregard for her own, Muslim standards of
personal modesty. That discussion and the outcome in Ibrahim are made
possible by Iqbal's embrace of judicial subjectivity, its valorization of
judges' intuitive views of plausibility to the detriment of minority
litigants whose claims of discrimination may well have been borne out
by a fuller set of facts had their cases been allowed to proceed into
discovery. The Ibrahim court's subjective litmus test for plausibility
required either an express verbalization of discriminatory intent or else
(perhaps) conduct that would violate personal modesty according to nonMuslim standards.' 15 In that sense, Ibrahim replicated and perhaps
exceeded Iqbal's approach in setting an impossibly high bar: it isn't
discrimination unless the party engaging in discrimination says so
explicitly.
B.

Racial DiscriminationClaims and Iqbal

While Iqbal appears, even at this early stage, to have impacted how
judges assess the plausibility of claims raised by Arab, South Asian, or
Muslim plaintiffs after 9/11, the wide latitude to inject judicial
subjectivity into the plausibility calculus also seems to have affected how
judges view discrimination claims brought by minority plaintiffs
Studies have shown that judicial
generally, not just Muslims.
assessments of a lawsuit's merit are not impervious to judges' own
114. Id.
115. In holding that the forced removal of Ibrahim's headscarf did not burden her
right to religious expression, the Ibrahim court distinguished Khatib v. County of Orange,
2008 WL 822562 (C.D. Cal. March 26, 2008), in which the Central District Court in
California held that a court officer's refusal to allow a Muslim plaintiff to wear her
headscarf in the courtroom and court holding cell was a free exercise clause violation.
Ibrahim, 2009 WL 2246194, at *10. According to the district court, the key difference
between Ibrahim and Khatib's claims was that Khatib was forced to remove her
headscarf for a prolonged period of time in the presence of male non-family members.
Id. The distinction between the two cases-and Ibrahim's disposition-hinged on the
judge's subjective assessment of how long an observant Muslim woman's hair would
have to be exposed in order to make out a colorable claim. By valorizing judges'
subjective assessments of threshold plausibility, the post-Iqbaljudicial landscape already
appears far less welcoming to Muslim discrimination victims looking for vindication in
the courts. In that sense, Iqbal will further sap Muslim and other minority communities'
faith in the courts' ability to deliver redress and justice.
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experiences, perceptions, and backgrounds, especially in regards to
race.
Recent caselaw after Iqbal suggests that minority plaintiffs
seeking remedies for constitutional violations, especially racial
discrimination, must now clearly plead purposeful or invidious
discrimination to withstand a motion to dismiss.
1.

Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, Va.

In Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Larry Monroe's Section 1983 claim
that Charlottesville police officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights when they conducted an unreasonable search and
seizure and unlawfully targeted him on the basis of his race by
approaching him at his home and asking for a DNA sample."17 The
police officers that came to Monroe's house were conducting an
investigation to identify a serial rapist, described in part by victims as
"youthful-looking" and "African American," who had assaulted several
women in the Charlottesville area." 8 As part of the investigation, the
Charlottesville Police Department approached all youthful-looking
African American men in Charlottesville to ask for a DNA sample,
resulting in stops of approximately 190 African American men." 9
Monroe alleged that the department approached African American men
indiscriminately based on a prohibited racial classificationl 2 0 and that the
police would not have adopted such a sweeping approach had the
assailant been white.121
In dismissing both Monroe's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims, the Fourth Circuit found that the police department did not
approach Monroe and other African American men based on their race,
but rather because they matched a physical description provided by
several victims of a criminal suspect.122 In justifying its conclusion, the
court noted that "[t]his is not a case in which police created a criminal
profile of their own volition and decided which characteristics, such as
race, that the criminal possessed." 2 3 The Fourth Circuit quoted liberally
from the Iqbal majority opinion to show that, as in Iqbal, no invidious
discrimination existed when the result of a law enforcement policy has a

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See supra Section II.
Monroe v. City of Charlottesville., 579 F.3d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 382.
Monroe, 579 F.3d at 387-88.
Id. at 388.
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"disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims," or-in the case at
hand-African American men. 124
Analogizing the Charlottesville Police Department's sweeping
investigation of African American men to the investigations of Arab
Muslim men at issue in Iqbal, the court said: "Even though thousands of
Arab-Muslim men were investigated in Iqbal, the Supreme Court
deemed this insufficient to render a legitimate investigatory process
unconstitutional. This leaves no doubt as to the justifiability of the
[Charlottesville Police Department's] investigation."l 25 Both Iqbal's
pleading standard and its fact and policy-specific analysis were applied
directly and by analogy to legitimize the policy at issue in Monroe and
justify dismissal of the claims in that case. That Monroe borrows Iqbal's
"obvious alternative explanation" to sweep aside the disparate impact of
a law enforcement investigation on African American men highlights the
Iqbal effect's expansiveness beyond the national security terrain where it
first arose and the Muslim population to whom it was originally applied.
2.

Hayden v. Paterson

In another extension of Iqbal outside the national security context,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard a claim brought by Black and
Latino plaintiffs with felony convictions challenging the constitutionality
of New York's felon disenfranchisement laws. 12 6 The plaintiffs alleged
that the felon disenfranchisement laws, adopted in the 1800s, were based
on racial animus, and that the racial animus was still legally operative, as
reflected by the laws' present day disparate impact on Black and Latino
New Yorkers' constitutional right to vote. 127 The Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim, holding that the complaint
failed to show that the disenfranchisement laws were still operating with
the specific discriminatory intent to exclude African Americans and
Latinos from voting.128
In the complaint, the plaintiffs described in great detail the historical
context of New York's felon disenfranchisement laws passed in the
1800s and pointed to instances of intentional racial discrimination, such
as the law's requirement when first passed in 1777 that only "property
holders and free men" were eligible to vote. 129 While the Second Circuit
acknowledged that this legislative history sufficiently demonstrated

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 390.
Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 158.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 157.
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intentional and invidious discrimination in the historical genesis of New
York's voting laws," it held that the historical racial animus was no
longer present in the current iteration of the felon disenfranchisement
laws.13 ' The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' allegations that despite
being facially neutral, the laws have a racially disparate impact on
African Americans and Latinos.132
Based on the two-pronged analysis from Iqbal, the Hayden court
held that the facts alleging racial discrimination after the 1894 provision
of the disenfranchisement laws were conclusory and did not "nudge
[their] claims of invidious discrimination across the line from
conceivable to plausible."' 3 3 In its plausibility analysis, the court
tellingly said, "whether the facially neutral disenfranchisement provision
'restricted the suffrage of minorities' in effect and intent is the very
assertion that plaintiffs must prove,"l 34 even though it acknowledged
earlier in the opinion that discriminatory intent was clearly present in the
early versions of the law. In the Hayden court's view, the "obvious
alternative explanation" was the state's legitimate purpose of excluding
from voting individuals convicted of felonies.' 35 The court justified its
conclusion by noting that unless the plaintiffs could plead facts showing
that the current disparate impact of the felon disenfranchisement laws is
unexplainable on grounds other than race, their claim of racial
discrimination was not plausible.' 36 By requiring a showing that the
disparate impact cannot be explained on grounds other than race, the
Hayden court arguably goes well beyond what Iqbal calls for. In effect,
the Hayden court transforms Iqbal's subjective plausibility test requiring
that the claim be plausible in the judge's view into a strict causality
test-plaintiffs must demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that invidious
discrimination was the sole plausible explanation.
C

Plausibilityafter Iqbal

Because judicial outcomes are not insulated from the influence of
judges' backgrounds and because Iqbal gives judges ample berth to
express their subjective outlooks as they apply the indeterminate
130. Id. at 164-65.
131. Hayden, 594 F.3d at 165-66.
132. Id. at 164. Plaintiffs cited to statistics such as the substantially higher
incarceration rates of Blacks and Latinos compared to whites, and disproportionate
likelihood that whites convicted of similar felonies would receive a sentence of probation
instead of incarceration. Plaintiffs also noted that under the felon disenfranchisement
laws, 87% of individuals unable to vote were Blacks and Latinos.
133. Id. at 161.
134. Id. at 162.
135. Id. at 167.
136. Hayden, 594 F.3d at 168.
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plausibility standard to incipient claims, Iqbal raises concern that Muslim
and other minority plaintiffs asserting discrimination claims may fare
poorly unless pleading standards are readjusted. Indeed, the fear is that
judicial subjectivity may well cut against such plaintiffs, given pervasive
negative views of Muslim Americans and, more generally, in light of the
federal judiciary's composition. Discrimination claims are particularly
vulnerable to an unfavorable application of dispositive judicial discretion
at the threshold stage because such claims require a showing of animus
or deliberate, invidious intent.137 The Iqbal subjective plausibility
standard potentially arms majority group skepticism towards claims of
invidious discrimination asserted by minorities, particularly ones already
viewed with suspicion. Thus, as discriminatory animus or intent is rarely
patent or explicit, seldom will such plaintiffs wield sufficient facts before
discovery to allege a plausible claim under Iqbal. And, as Arar
illustrates, even claims alleging indisputable government misconduct will
fail unless the conduct can be attributed to specific, named defendants.
Cases after Iqbal where Muslim and minority plaintiffs have made out
plausible discrimination claims only further highlight the almost
impossible odds now faced by such claimants.
Recent caselaw suggests that the key to nudging claims of invidious
discrimination "across the line from conceivable to plausible"'" 8 is to
plead facts demonstrating a defendant's personal and purposeful role in
the alleged misconduct. In Padillav. Yoo, the Northern District Court in
California held that Jose Padilla, who was designated an enemy
combatant and held in a military brig for more than three years, 13 9 had
pled a plausible claim under Bivens against then Deputy Attorney
General John Yoo, one of the main legal architects of the Bush
administration's detention and interrogation policies in the "war on
terror." 4 0 In finding Padilla's allegations to be plausible, the District
Court looked to the complaint's specific allegations that Yoo had
137. Ironically, Iqbal intervenes and raises these troubling implications at a time
when immigration advocates are pressing for greaterjudicial discretion and subjectivity
in deportation cases. This suggests that the granting and withholding of discretion to
judicial officers in our legal system can be strategic. Iqbal grants judges discretion to cut
back on minority rights, while immigration judges' discretion remains limited, as such
discretion could only be exercised favorably, to mitigate adverse structural effects on
immigrants, given the rules and strictures in place. Immigrants, of course, are the
archetypal insular minority. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938) (acknowledging that "more searching judicial inquiry" is appropriate to
counteract "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities"); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 151 (1980) (observing that non-citizens are perhaps the most
obvious example of a "discrete and insular" minority "since aliens typically can't vote").
138. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.
139. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
140. Id. at 1014.
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personally reviewed and issued an opinion on whether to declare Padilla
an enemy combatant,14' and overseen memoranda produced by his office
justifying practices such as waterboarding and mock burial that Padilla
was subjected to during his detention.142 Yoo's demonstrable personal
involvement in key decisions about Padilla's status and detention were
critical to the court's threshold finding of plausibility under Iqbal.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that Abdullah al-Kidd, a Muslim
convert who was arrested and detained at Dulles International Airport in
Virginia en route to Saudi Arabia where he was to continue his Islamic
studies, pled a plausible claim under Bivens, alleging that the U.S.
government unlawfully and pretextually detained him under the federal
material witness statute because it wished to hold him as a potential
terrorist suspect but lacked criminal proof to do so.14 3 Al-Kidd filed his
Bivens action after he was arrested and detained for sixteen days in
maximum security settings, then released upon court order but kept
under governmental supervision for fifteen months. At no point was he
charged with a crime, nor was he called upon to testify as a witness at
any trial.144 Citing to statements made by then-Attorney General
Ashcroft and other Department of Justice officials on the use of the
material witness statute to detain potential terrorist suspects,145 the Ninth
Circuit held that, "unlike in Iqbal, these are not bare allegations that the
Attorney General 'knew of the policy. Here, the complaint contains
allegations that plausibly suggest that Ashcroft purposely instructed his
subordinates to bypass the plain reading of the [material witness]
statute."l 46 On March 18, 2010, the Ninth Circuit voted to deny a
petition for rehearing en banc filed by the government.14 7
Padilla and al-Kidd illustrate acutely the difficulty of getting such
cases past the threshold plausibility assessment under Iqbal. They are
outliers in the sense that the plaintiffs could point to direct, public, and
pertinent admissions by named defendants.14 8 Such overwhelming proof
141. Id. at 1033.
142. Id.
143. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2009).
144. Id. at 952-53.
145. Id. at 975.
146. Id. at 976.
147. al-Kidd, No. 06-36059, 2010 WL 961855, at *4 (9th Cir. March 18, 2010)
(affirming earlier Ninth Circuit decision that "al-Kidd alleged sufficient facts in his
complaint to state a claim that [defendant Attorney General] Ashcroft directly violated
the material witness statute by his own personal conduct" and affirming "district court's
decision, allowing al-Kidd's case to proceed against Ashcroft beyond the pleading
stage").
148. Dawinder Sidhu notes that al-Kidd is an anomaly among civil rights cases
because Mr. al-Kidd possessed such clear evidence of intentional misconduct. Sidhu,
supra note 94, at 70. Sidhu notes:
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of misconduct at the pleading stage left little room for the assertion of
"obvious alternative explanations" or for the unfavorable exercise of
subjectivity or "common sense." That Iqbal is already being read to
require the uncommon as a prerequisite to threshold viability augurs
restricted access to the courts for certain groups.
D.

Appellate Reversals and Other Emerging Trends

Though some of the trends emerging in the wake of Iqbal and
examined above are troubling, caselaw also suggests some important
areas in which Iqbal has had negligible impact, and reflects ways in
which courts have begun to correct for and cabin Iqbal's flaws.
1.

Fourth Amendment Claims under Iqbal

At cursory glance, application of Iqbal's stringent pleading
standards appears to carry little consequence for claims that do not
require discriminatory purpose, including ones brought under the Fourth
Amendment. An illustrative recent case is Argueta v. U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enforcement,14 9 which successfully survived a motion to
dismiss on the plaintiffs' claims that they were subject to unlawful
searches and seizures under ICE's pattern of nighttime raids at peoples'
homes with only an administrative warrant. 5 0
Disagreeing with ICE's contention that Iqbal required dismissal of
the plaintiffs' claims, the New Jersey District Court highlighted several
ways in which the case at hand differed from Iqbal. First,Iqbal involved
an equal protection claim that required proof of discriminatory purpose,
an element not required under a Fourth Amendment claim.1 5' Second, in
Iqbal the Supreme Court held that the government's detention of Javaid
Iqbal as a person of high interest was lawful under the reasonable
alternative explanation that his arrest was part of a legitimate government
investigation of individuals suspected of terrorism activities.' 52 Here, no
legitimate explanation existed to support ICE's pattern of conducting
unlawful raids using administrative warrants that were deficient for the
[D]irect evidence of intent is rarely unearthed in the course of litigation, let
alone possessed at the pleadings stage. As a result, al-Kidd should be viewed
as an unusual case or high-water mark in terms of what a plaintiff alleging that
high-level officials committed illegal conduct may aver at the pleadings stage,
not the minimum that all complaints need to meet to defeat a motion to dismiss.
Id.
149.
Jan. 27,
150.
151.
152.

Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 2010 WL 398839 (D.N.J.
2010).
Id.at*10.
Id. at *6.
Id.
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purposes of entering and searching private homes.15 3 The district court in
Argueta also focused on the fact that the named defendants were ICE
officials responsible for raid policies and practices and who had direct
and specific knowledge that the raids were being conducted in an

unlawful manner.15 4
2.

Judicial Corrections to Iqbal's Flaws

District and appellate courts have also begun to correct for the flaws
in Iqbal that can lead to potentially meritorious cases being dismissed at
the pleadings stage. For example, the District Court for the Northern
District of California held in Committeefor Immigrant Rights of Sonoma
County v. County of Sonoma that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient
facts to withstand a motion to dismiss against their claim for injunctive
relief to prevent U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enforcement from
conducting future pretextual traffic stops to enforce immigration law. 55
The complaint, filed by an immigrant rights organization on behalf of
Latino and Latina community members in Sonoma County, alleged that
Sonoma County deputy sheriffs and federal ICE agents conducted
targeted traffic stops of Latino residents on the basis of race and that
individuals were being stopped solely for immigration enforcement
purposes without any actual or suspected criminal basis, a warrant, or
probable cause. 56
Citing to the pleading standard from Iqbal, the district court found
that the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss on
their claim for injunctive relief'57 against ICE to prevent future pretextual
stops' 58 and also sufficiently pled a cause of action against Sonoma
County for its role in the traffic stopS.1 59 The court also allowed for
153. Id. at *7.
154. Id. at *7-8.
155. Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County et al. v. County of Sonoma, 644
F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
156. Id. at 1186.
157. In holding that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to
dismiss on their injunctive claim, the district court looked to City ofLos Angeles v. Lyons,
in which the Supreme Court held that Lyons, a plaintiff who had been put in a chokehold
by Los Angeles Police Department officers during a routine traffic stop, could not seek
injunctive relief as he could not prove that he was likely to suffer the same injury again.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). The district court distinguished
the facts at hand from Lyons by noting that the plaintiffs here alleged a pattern or practice
of unlawful pretext stops based on race and suspected immigration status, and that the
plaintiffs were likely to encounter ICE agents and Sonoma County deputies again as they
lived in neighborhoods are regularly patrolled by the defendants. Comm. for Immigrant
Rights ofSonoma County, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1195-96.
158. Id. at 1195.
159. Id. at 1207.
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limited discovery, stressing the importance of allowing plaintiffs access
to more information, even in light of Iqbal's heightened pleading
standard. 60 In doing so, the district court noted that even though the
complaint was deficient in some respects, there was an obligation to
balance the many competing factors-discovery, issues of qualified
immunity, and clarification and amendment of the deficient claims.' 6 1
The district court added that despite Iqbal having been cited nearly 1,000
times in the prior two months, lower courts have been given little
guidance on how to balance the sufficiency of the pleadings with the
necessity to engage in discovery.162
Similarly, the district court for the Central District of California
held in Gordon v. City of Moreno Valley that the plaintiffs, African
American barbershop owners and employees in Moreno Valley, alleged
sufficient facts under Iqbal in their Section 1983 claim against local
Moreno Valley government officials who singled out their barbershops
for excessively invasive administrative inspections and raids because
their clientele were primarily black Moreno Valley residents. 16 3 In
finding that the plaintiffs had alleged a plausible claim, the district court
noted that the raids against the two barbershops followed a similar
pattern: they were conducted by Moreno Valley police officers, who
unannounced ran into the barbershop wearing bulletproof vests with their
firearms displayed'" and were followed by Board and Code
Enforcement inspectors, who searched all areas of the barbershop as part
of an "administrative code inspection," including areas where no
barbering took place but where customers often gathered to play cards
and dominoes.'s The police officers blocked the entrances to the
barbershop to prevent customers from leavingl 6 6 and questioned
customers, demanded to see identification, and ran warrant checks on
them.167
In finding that the complaint plausibly alleged the defendants'
discriminatory intent-an element necessary to sustain an equal
protection claim-the district court looked to the intrusive nature of the
160. Id. at 1210.
16 1. Id.
162. Id. at 1210-11 ("There is little case law, however, in the wake of Iqbal
elucidating the relationship between the adequacy of the pleadings and the plaintiffs
right to engage in discovery and the court has not yet determined exactly how it will
apply the reasoning of that case to this and the hundreds of other pending cases on the
court's docket.").
163. Gordon v. City of Moreno Valley, No. 09-688, 2009 WL 3088557, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 31, 2009).
164. Id. at *2.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Gordon, 2009 WL 3088557, at *2.
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inspections and the fact that these "unusually aggressive" raids had only
been conducted at African American barbershops.' 68 The court said:
[I]t can be inferred that there was a discriminatory intent in
performing the inspections, the inference presumably being that
defendants engaged in a form of racial profiling of African American
barbershops perceiving them as somehow a den of criminal activity
simply because they are owned and frequented by African American
men.
Using the two-pronged approach in Iqbal to review the sufficiency
of the factual allegations, the court found that, unlike in Iqbal, here there
was no "obvious alternative explanation" to support a nondiscriminatory
purpose for the defendants' conduct.o70
Though heartening, these and other district court cases nonetheless
further expose the openness of the Iqbal plausibility standard. The
threshold assessment will come out differently depending on the type of
claimant, category of claim, and judge's background and subjective bent.
With scant guidance from higher courts on how to gauge plausibility,
district court judges are left to their own subjective devices, which they
are under no obligation to articulate, since the Supreme Court itself
condoned reliance on conclusory judicial declarations of implausibility
when dismissing complaints. That said, albeit in small numbers, federal
appellate courts have begun to reverse district court dismissals under
Rule 12(b)(6) where Iqbal was deemed to have been applied too
stringently. From a search on April 2, 2010, of the 312 federal appellate
cases thus far citing Iqbal, twenty-six out of those 312 reversed the lower
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim.' 7 ' Though appellate courts
have not been especially vocal in criticizing district courts for
168.

Id. at *10.

169.

Id.

170. Id.
171. The federal appellate courts have reversed district courts' dismissals in a wide
variety of cases, including contracts, insurance, civil rights, prisoners' rights, fraud, and
torts cases. For a partial list of appellate cases that have reversed dismissals based on
Iqbal, see Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D. Mass. 2009) (reversing dismissal of
prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim alleging sexual abuse by prison guard and deliberate
indifference to the safety of herself and other female prisoners); see also Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that plaintiff pled sufficient facts
to state plausible employment discrimination claim); U.S. v. Rolls Royce Corp., 570 F.3d
849 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that facts alleged do not have to exclude all alternative
possibilities in order to meet heightened pleading standard under Iqbal); Braden v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 2009 WL 4062105 (8th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009) (holding that plaintiff does
not have burden of rebutting all alternative explanations to plead sufficient claim under
Iqbal); and Waters Edge Living LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co., 2009 WL 4366031 (11th Cir.
Dec. 3, 2009) (finding that plaintiff alleged plausible claim under Iqbal even if facts did
not compel an inference so long as reasonable factfinder would draw that inference).
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misapplying Iqbal, some have instructed lower courts on how to assess a
claim's threshold viability under Iqbal. For example, in Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, the Third Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal
of the plaintiff s disability discrimination claim, noting:
At this stage of the litigation, the District Court should have focused
on the appropriate threshold question-namely whether Fowler
pleaded she is an individual with a disability. The District Court and
UPMC instead focused on what Fowler can "prove," apparently
maintaining that since she cannot prove she is disabled she cannot
sustain a prima facie failure-to-transfer claim. A determination
whether a primafacie case has been made, however, is an evidentiary
inquiry-it defines the quantum of proof plaintiff must present to
create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.1 72
Such guidance from appellate courts, however, remains rare and
does not meaningfully reach into the realm where Iqbal's impact will
likely be most dramatic: cases arising from claims of invidious
discrimination advanced by Muslim plaintiffs in the national security
setting and by minority group plaintiffs generally.
CONCLUSION
Though it is still quite early for the formulation of definitive
conclusions, a pattern is already apparent. As the analysis in this Article
anticipates, an overview of its progeny thus far reflects the gravity of the
threat Iqbal poses to equal protection. That cursory survey offers
sprouting proof that the establishment of what is essentially a subjective
plausibility standard entrenches majority group skepticism towards
discrimination claims, to the detriment of lawsuits brought by members
of minority groups, which can now be more readily dismissed. Iqbal
more closely connects outcomes to judges' personal outlooks-some
judges are now more at liberty to dismiss claims they subjectively regard
as fanciful, while other courts may permit similar claims to proceed.
Iqbal has recalibrated the scales, pegging judicial outcomes in certain
kinds of cases to personal outlook and temperament.
There are many conceivable responses to Iqbal. Some members of
Congress have introduced legislative proposals that would pull the rug
out from under Iqbal by restoring the Conley pleading standard. Senator
Arlen Specter introduced a bill in the Senate in July 2009, the Notice
Pleading Restoration Act, that would restore pleading to the preTwombly standard under Conley.13 The bill is currently in committee.

172.
173.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009).
Notice Pleading Restoration Act, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Representative Jerrold Nadler introduced the Open Access to the Courts
Act to the same end.17 4
Another idea for how courts can respond to the strictures imposed
by Iqbal while perhaps addressing problems that antedated the decision
would be to allow limited discovery before ruling on a motion to dismiss,
especially for civil rights plaintiffs, so that potentially meritorious claims
advanced by plaintiffs who do not have sufficient evidence due to
informational asymmetries are not prematurely dismissed. After all,
what might be appropriate in commercial litigation under Twombly does
not necessarily hold in civil rights cases. Informational and power
asymmetries between parties tend to be more pronounced in the latter
category of cases. State of mind takes on pivotal importance. This
accommodation could be achieved by operation of the common law's
incremental process or through formal adoption by the appropriate
judicial rules committee of different pleading standards by type of claim
asserted.175 Because these are vastly different processes that are slow
and gradual, pursuing both while keeping sight of the fact that neither is
likely to deliver prompt satisfaction is important.' 76
As things stand, however, given the reality that judicial outcomes
are not insulated from the influence of judges' backgrounds, and because
Iqbal gives judges ample berth to express their subjective outlooks as
they apply the indeterminate plausibility standard to incipient claims,
Muslim and other minority plaintiffs asserting discrimination claims are
likely to fare poorly unless pleading standards are readjusted. Indeed,
174. Open Access to the Courts Act, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). It bears
emphasis that our pleading system has been broken for many years and access to the
courts, especially for plaintiffs alleging civil rights violations, has diminished
significantly over the past few decades. Ultimately, restoring pleading to the Conley
standard would only provide an imperfect and incomplete fix to a very real and
longstanding problem.
175. One could also direct guidance at plaintiffs in the post-Iqbal world. An obvious
recommendation would be to pay close attention to cases such as Padillaand Al-Kidd and
to plead as concretely as possible, with as much amplification as can be adduced, steering
clear of apparently conclusory language. More creatively, Professor Gildin suggests that
claimants explore sub-federal options under state constitutions. Gary Gildin, The
Supreme Court's Legislative Agenda to Free Government from Accountability for
ConstitutionalDeprivations, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1333 (2010).
176. Some would advocate more aggressive promotion of judicial diversity as a
systemic fix. This approach would not necessarily require a massive influx of judges
hailing from heretofore underrepresented groups. As studies of the "panel effect"
evidence, even relatively limited strides in the direction of increased diversity can yield a
disproportionate impact on judicial outcomes. See supra, nn. 73-88 and accompanying
text. However, given the numerical reality of minority groups, even if their
representation were proportional, it would be unlikely in any given case that minority
judges would either preside or be on a multi-judge appellate panel. The more realistic
aim would be to bring the judiciary-in its instant composition-back within constraints
where it can continue to serve its historic purpose of protecting minority rights.
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there is ample cause for concern that judicial subjectivity will cut against
such plaintiffs, given pervasive negative views of Muslim Americans
and, more generally, in light of the federal judiciary's composition.
Discrimination claims are particularly vulnerable to an unfavorable
application of dispositive judicial discretion at the threshold stage
because such claims require a showing of animus or deliberate, invidious
intent.
By valorizing judges' subjective assessments of threshold
plausibility, the post-Iqbal judicial landscape already appears far less
welcoming to Muslim discrimination victims looking for vindication in
the courts. In that sense, Iqbal will further sap Muslim and other
minority communities' faith in the courts' ability to deliver redress and
justice. That Monroe borrows Iqbal's "obvious alternative explanation"
meme to sweep aside the disparate impact of a law enforcement
investigation on African American men highlights the Iqbal effect's
expansiveness beyond the national security terrain where it first arose
and the Muslim population to whom it was originally applied.
For minority litigants claiming discrimination, Iqbal has turned
process into the foe of substance. The procedural barrier to entry has
been raised so high as to render the odds of ultimate substantive success
slim. Under Iqbal, the theoretical availability of courts as a forum for
discrimination claims is belied by the practical difficulty of bringing
viable claims and actually obtaining redress. The disingenuous nature of
the resulting state of affairs-offering a mirage of justice, an alluring
promise seldom fulfilled-should be alarming to anyone with a concern
for the integrity of the American constitutional scheme. Undoing Iqbal
may be the sole path to restoring the courts fully to their natural and
historical function as a haven for insular and unpopular minorities.
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